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Abstract	<p>Human computation includes the accumulation of social wisdom in the form of progressive social agendas. These agendas developed rapidly during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries through the distributed intelligence made possible by advanced information technologies. Progressive social agendas build toward equality among groups differentiated by race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and similar factors. It is no accident that these trends, distinctive in human history, occurred during an era in which national and international communication and the creation and widespread dispersal of information were enabled by advanced technologies. In this chapter I discuss future threats to social progress and the importance of maintaining the information and communication technologies and infrastructures that underpin such progress.</p>
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# The Role of Human Computation in Sustainability, or, Social Progress Is Made of Fossil Fuels

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Bonnie Nardi

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## The Probable Future

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We in the Global North enjoy historically high levels of wealth and economic security. Our present abundance seems inevitable, deserved, stable. We do not believe our lives will ever be like those of people who lived during the Great Depression, or of struggling middle and lower classes in chronically economically depressed areas of the world. Yet a sober look at economic and environmental indicators strongly suggests that we are headed for a future of decreasing abundance. The goal of this chapter is to sketch a future of economic decline and discuss how we should prioritize computational resources to prevent the erosion of social gains achieved during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The argument is not about “saving the environment” or sustaining current lifestyles (which is impossible), but about sustaining and extending progressive social changes accrued during the period of industrial expansion. Human computation emerges as a positive force when collective human intelligence and technology are used together to solve problems and promote progressive changes (see Hourcade and Nathan, this volume). In this chapter, I make an argument for the likelihood of economic decline, and contend that information technology will serve an indispensable role in maintaining social progress. Technology has the capacity to help us defy historical patterns in which decline leads to regressive social trends in human relations.

Progressive change is built on what Clay Shirky calls a “cognitive surplus” (Shirky 2010). Shirky describes the cognitive surplus as abundant wealth that allows time for online participation such as crowdsourcing, writing fan fiction, game modding, and so on. But the notion of cognitive surplus is more general: wealth affords

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With apologies to Tomlinson and Silberman (2012), of which more in a moment.

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28 people the time and energy to do things other than meet basic needs. We have a lot  
29 of free time because our economic system is so productive. In this chapter I draw  
30 attention to one of the things some people have done with the cognitive surplus:  
31 develop and promote progressive social agendas. Some people spend their surplus  
32 watching television (up to several hours a day), but luckily for most of us, a persist-  
33 ent, energetic collection of various kinds of activists has been spending their look-  
34 ing out for our rights.

35 For most of human history, rights for workers, women, children, LGBTQ<sup>1</sup> per-  
36 sons, the disabled, the aged, the ill, and minority populations were unheard of. The  
37 dominant group (usually able-bodied men of the primary race/ethnicity) simply ran  
38 things. As an anthropologist I had the opportunity during the early days of my  
39 career to live in two such societies, one in Western Samoa and the other in Papua  
40 New Guinea. These were village-based societies with low levels of literacy, practic-  
41 ing agriculture with hand tools. Although communities in these cultures provided  
42 close social bonds of the sort that have eroded to some degree in industrial society,  
43 and the communities produced beautiful art, it was also true that women had no  
44 voice in governance, the disabled were ignored or ridiculed, and people with alter-  
45 nate sexual orientations were devalued. “Domestic violence” was not even a linguis-  
46 tic category of action because hitting women and children was seen as a natural  
47 mode of discipline. Old people, unproductive in a horticultural setting, were often  
48 isolated and untended as they grew feeble and sick.

49 Largely during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, conditions changed as  
50 social activists addressed themselves to an Enlightenment agenda of progress,  
51 defined as equality for less equal groups. In industrial societies, workers and minori-  
52 ties were important groups for whom it was necessary to extend rights, in addition  
53 to women, the disabled, and so on.

54 We have not by any means solved the problems of inequality. Groups such as the  
55 mentally ill, homeless, and those addicted to drugs, are still often completely out-  
56 side societal protections. We are a ways from true equality for all groups. Nonetheless,  
57 it is important that we recognize the immense progress that has been achieved. This  
58 progress is recent, tenuous, expensive to sustain, and far from stable. Looking to the  
59 future, equality is threatened in a scenario of economic decline because the cogni-  
60 tive surplus will be reduced as wealth is reduced. If we are economically stressed we  
61 will address ourselves to what will reasonably seem like more pressing problems  
62 such as food security, maintaining social order, providing shelter.

63 Is there a role for information technology in sustaining hard won gains in social  
64 equality? I believe there is. This chapter sketches probable causes for economic  
65 decline, followed by a discussion of what we know of “collapsed” societies histori-  
66 cally, and how information technology might enable us to defy historical patterns.  
67 Both activist and technical activity will be necessary. Human computation should  
68 include using human cognitive capacity to understand how to deploy technical  
69 resources wisely, with compassion and social foresight—not only for instrumental

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<sup>1</sup>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer.

purposes of efficiency and corporate profit. I argue that notions of human computation must, recursively, develop a clear sense of why we are using computation in the first place, understanding how it enhances human life. Vint Cerf recently called upon the ACM membership to “develop better tools and [a] much deeper understanding of the systems we invent” (2012). Cerf acknowledges that in its short history, computer science has transformed human experience, but he also notes that it has offered much less in terms of tools and practices for comprehending what it has unleashed. The call for the *Handbook of Human Computation* identifies “creativity, intuition, symbolic and logical reasoning” as central to human computation. These capacities derive from our lengthy sociobiological evolution from primitive humans to *homo sapiens sapiens*, but the speed with which we have only recently developed sophisticated information technologies along with a progressive social agenda, derive directly from the cognitive surplus.

**The Wealth of Our Nations**

Tomlinson and Silberman (2012) argue that “the cognitive surplus is made of fossil fuels.” They remark that while Shirky takes the cognitive surplus as a given and seeks only to describe it, we must also understand how the cognitive surplus is possible, and why it occurred during the current historical era. Tomlinson and Silberman observe that our free time is not really quite so free:

Both the free time that forms the “raw material” of the cognitive surplus and the technologies and practices of coordination that enable it to be treated as a single resource rely on huge technological infrastructures. These infrastructures are largely powered by fossil fuels.

So what will happen when we run out of fossil fuels? These fuels, in particular oil, are the most energy dense substances humanity has ever had at its disposal. One barrel of oil is the equivalent of about 25,000 h of human manual labor (McKibben 2010). Hawken et al. (1999) observe that:

Machines powered by water, wood, charcoal, coal, oil, and eventually electricity accelerated or accomplished some or all of the work formerly performed by laborers. Human productive capabilities began to grow exponentially. What took two hundred workers in 1770 could be done by a single spinner in the British textile industry by 1812.

And of course we have come a long way in efficiency since 1812.

But it is imperative to remember that fossil fuels are finite resources. Even disregarding the costs of environmental cleanup and health impacts the extraction and use of fossil fuels entail (see e.g., O’Rourke and Connolly 2003; U.S. National Research Council 2010; Epstein et al. 2011; IPCC 2012), the fact is that these resources are not forever. They will first become expensive, then prohibitively expensive, and then they will run out (see Hirsch et al.’s report for the US Department of Energy (2005)). Energy conservation, something we do not like to think much about, will be necessary.

110 Alternative sources of energy such as solar will be more fully utilized in the  
111 future. But alternative energies are no match for fossil fuels in terms of energy pro-  
112 duced. Solar, for example, does not work well when the sun is not shining. In China,  
113 where solar energy is used much more widely than in the US, residents take short  
114 showers in the winter and put up with more discomfort than Americans and  
115 Europeans are used to (Gui, 2013, personal communication). All alternative energy  
116 sources rely on at least some fossil fuels for production and distribution (Zehner  
117 2012). There is no energy cornucopia waiting for us to tap into; we live on a specific  
118 planet, with specific resources. We are in the process of using up those resources.  
119 O'Rourke and Connolly (2003) observe that going forward it will cost more to  
120 extract remaining fossil fuels, including escalating environmental and health costs:

121 On- and off-shore exploration, drilling, and extraction activities are inherently invasive and  
122 affect ecosystems, human health, and local cultures. [Impacts] include deforestation, eco-  
123 system destruction, chemical contamination of air and water, long-term harm to animal  
124 populations (particularly migratory birds and marine mammals), human health and safety  
125 risks for neighboring communities and...workers.

126 It seems likely that our reliance on fossil fuels will end in an economic decline to  
127 which we will have to adapt. This reality appears all but inevitable given several  
128 factors in addition to the finiteness of fossil fuels. First, we are doing little to alter  
129 current patterns of consumption; there is no real effort to conserve remaining  
130 resources. On the contrary, we are engaging in destructive, costly practices such as  
131 fracking to extract difficult-to-access oil and natural gas. Second, it is not feasible to  
132 expect that biofuels and other sources of alternative energy will be direct replace-  
133 ments for fossil fuels because their equivalencies to human labor are far below that  
134 of oil (Zehner 2012). Third, there are huge social costs to alternative energies; e.g.,  
135 biofuels take land out of food production (Zehner 2012).

136 While it might seem that humans will once again pull the rabbit out of the hat in  
137 maintaining current levels of energy consumption through advances in technology,  
138 there are two things to consider. First, the price of the current prosperity of the  
139 Global North comes at the expense of the Global South. Our global society is one of  
140 massive inequality. Considerable global collapse already exists, once we look  
141 beyond the privileged countries of the West. Meadows et al. (1982) commented,  
142 "The view that global crises will occur in the future reflects a parochial, developed-  
143 world perspective. For two-thirds of the world's population, crises of scarce  
144 resources, inadequate housing, deplorable conditions of health, and starvation are  
145 already at hand." Our "success" as a populous species is deeply inequitable, and we  
146 can therefore expect increasing civil unrest with fewer resources with which to  
147 address it because armies, drones, and so forth, rely on fossil fuels. We can expect  
148 citizens in rapidly developing countries such as China to ramp up toward Western  
149 levels of consumption which will hasten the depletion of fossil fuels. Second, tech-  
150 nological proposals like space-based solar farms are far in the future, if they are  
151 feasible at all. They would require great quantities of fossil fuels and would cost  
152 vast sums. Given that only 12 people have ever set foot on our nearest neighbor the  
153 moon (a long time ago), and that NASA's Mars Mission's most ambitious proposal  
154 for the near future is "the return of Martian soil and rock samples for studies in labo-  
155 ratories here on Earth" (NASA), it is an act of denial to suggest that we sit back and

wait for technological fixes. It thus seems prudent to use some of our current cognitive surplus to ask how we can begin to design information technologies for a future of scarcity, and to engage in an exercise of prioritizing which computational resources we should guarantee in a situation of scarcity.

In this chapter I am particularly concerned with protecting social gains as the environmental dangers are well rehearsed. What could it mean to design for social sustainability? The most important point is that we must absolutely protect the global communication channels the internet has created. *Social gains in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries were made not at local or regional levels, but at national and international levels.* Historian Christine Stansell describes the global feminist movement and how it not only mobilized women but coalitions of diverse constituencies in various locales. For example, the abortion reform movement represents the efforts of “physicians, psychiatrists, and family planning professionals along with activists” (Stansell 2011). Although abortion reform predates personal digital technology, these gains were made with modern communication technologies, and the continuing battle to protect rights, which in the United States are always under siege, is waged in part with digital tools. Rapid progress on issues such as marriage equality and other LGBTQ concerns owes much to digital technology, as do other critical social struggles (Driver 2007; Gray 2009).

It might seem a no-brainer to advocate for a free internet. But how many of us really consider that even now the internet is vulnerable to bids for repressive government control in countries like China, and corporate control in countries like the US where issues such as net neutrality are far from settled? If, for example, corporations who own the infrastructure were to discount costs of connectivity to selected rich corporations that can afford to pay in volume, while charging the rest of us a premium, activists and ordinary citizens would suffer. As technologists we may feel that these decisions are outside our purview, *but they are in fact decisions made by technologists in corporations.* In this era of deregulation, government oversight is attenuated. The checks and balances of governance designed into the American Constitution (and similar documents in other countries) cannot operate if corporations assume governance. Lessig argues that “code is law” (2006), i.e., that the ubiquitous software systems underpinning commerce and communication dictate what we can and cannot do. Facebook can preserve everything it knows about you and use the information in ways it finds profitable. Amazon can offer cloud computing for vital services at low cost today but who knows what the pricing will be tomorrow? By contrast, bear in mind that telephony pricing was once strictly controlled by the government in order to offer universal service, and privacy protections for certain kinds of information such as health-related data were put in place before the era of deregulation. We must thus acknowledge that we are moving toward law outside democratic process. Corporations are tasked with ensuring profits, not promoting progressive social agendas (see Suarez-Villa 2012). It seems likely that a future of scarcity will make it even more tempting to increase profits by, for example, moving away from net neutrality. Thus human computation must consider how to protect and sustain a free internet. Proposals such as wireless texting and data transfer undergirded by locally controlled infrastructure should be explored and promoted (Michelucci, personal communication).

202 **Learning from, Not Repeating, the Past**

203 The urgency of sustaining free global communication in a future of scarcity is evi-  
204 dent in the history contained in the archaeological record. Archaeological theories of  
205 collapse demonstrate that collapsed societies (such as the Maya, the Romans, and so  
206 on) lose complexity, *devolving to smaller scale units in smaller geographies* (Tainter  
207 1990). When collapse occurs, the costs of governing wider areas become untenable,  
208 and social units shrink to smaller forms. It is precisely such smaller scale units (like  
209 the Samoans and Papua New Guineans I lived amongst) that assert rule by elites.

210 Smaldino and Richerson (this volume) note, “Larger and more connected societ-  
211 ies can maintain more complex technologies.” They comment on the fragility of  
212 connected societies: “Much of our specialized knowledge is collected by institu-  
213 tions, and that knowledge could rapidly vanish. Skilled people can die, books can be  
214 burned, and computers can wear out.” It is only through protecting the strengths of  
215 modern information and communication technologies that connectedness, includ-  
216 ing broad coalitions of activists and citizens, can persist, uniting people to effect  
217 change and distribute control beyond small elites. In large-scale regimes of repres-  
218 sion (such as the Soviets or the Nazis), elites maintained control by suppressing the  
219 free exchange of information and exerting stringent control over communication.  
220 Commentators such as Morozov (2013) observe that large corporations, which in  
221 the contemporary context have as much or more power as governments, are not  
222 subject to anything like the Freedom of Information Act. Are we moving toward  
223 systems in which we cannot question those who set policy? (There is some irony in  
224 the fact that Facebook, Google, etc. which traffic in information are themselves  
225 behind information firewalls.) In this historical moment of deregulation, as we cede  
226 control to corporations that furnish indispensable infrastructures without which the  
227 economy—indeed society itself—cannot operate, we must ask to what extent cor-  
228 porate policies protect social gains and promote continuing activism. And we must  
229 ask how we as citizens will influence those policies which operate in a universe  
230 largely outside democracy. Stansell (2011) says that feminism is “democracy’s  
231 younger sister—an invocation of the linkages between progressive social forms and  
232 their necessary mutual reinforcement—as well as a reminder that protecting one  
233 involves protecting the other.

234 The history of social reform tells us that we do not want to return to the past, that  
235 nostalgia for simpler times is patently misplaced. It is in the current era of national  
236 and international communication and collaboration that we have rapidly won rights  
237 for the groups I discussed. Going forward, we need to use resources of human com-  
238 putation to prioritize sociotechnical projects to protect these rights. As Cerf said, it  
239 is important to develop a better understanding of the systems we invent, including  
240 their impacts on society. This prioritization is necessary as we envision a future of  
241 scarcity because the cognitive surplus will decline as we run out of fossil fuel. Time  
242 will be more precious. Levy (2007) invokes Thomas Aquinas to argue that time for  
243 reflection is a moral imperative, and that “self-destructive work-fanaticism” defeats  
244 efforts to live better. Without deliberately setting aside time for the most important



social projects, it will be easy to fall into “work-fanaticism” that erodes the gains we have accumulated in the era of cognitive surplus. 245  
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Since our problems—including ongoing and predicted environmental damage—are global, it is essential that we sustain and promote empowered citizens of all kinds to work together to confront what will be very severe changes. Not only are rights for women, the disabled, and so on, critical for human dignity, they are crucial for empowering all people to address the massive, pervasive changes science tells us are imminent (see Greene; Hourcade and Nathan; Meier, this volume). Information technology has the capacity to empower formerly relatively powerless groups. For example, Wicks and Little (this volume) discuss ways in which people with serious illnesses make unique contributions to healthcare through participation in online forums. The authors note that people suffering stigmatizing diseases such as AIDS deployed communication technologies to organize and change the course of AIDS research. Information technologies have had a profound impact on society in extending new kinds of participation to formerly disempowered groups. A goal going forward is to recognize the fragility of sociotechnical systems that Smaldino and Richerson (this volume) point to, and the enormous potential of the collective intelligence embodied in human computation. 247  
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We will move to a new future that does not look like the past but also is quite different from the present. We will not have the economic abundance to sustain the way we live now. What will we give up? The amount of cheap consumerist junk that overflows our landfills will decrease. It is likely that we will travel less, eat more local foods, live closer to workplaces, perhaps even grow some of our own food. Proposals for edible offices (EO 2013), revivals of the ancient art of aquaponics (Rakocy et al. 2006), and urban chicken ranching may seem a little wild-eyed, but they are on the horizon (and present interesting computational problems). These changes constitute probable improvements to current ways of life. But I hope we do not give up our global network of information and communication technologies. Research areas such as crisis informatics (Starbird and Palen 2011; Al-Ani et al. 2012), collapse informatics (Tomlinson et al. 2012, 2013), and ICTD (information and communication technologies for development) (Sambasivan et al. 2010; Toyama 2010; Woelfer et al. 2011) are beginning to address how we will sustain connectivity in less than perfect conditions by studying and designing for current situations in which resources are stressed. We have much to learn from these efforts including designing digital technologies for unstable electrical grids, ensuring communication during emergencies, and orienting ourselves to plan ahead to mitigate and even forestall problems. 263  
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**Coda** 282

As I was working on this chapter, the power on most of my campus was knocked out for several hours (something that had not happened in the 10 years I have been at the University of California, Irvine). I wrote in the glow of my battery-powered laptop, 283  
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286 mindful of the limited resource I on which I was now relying. As it happened, during  
287 the outage, Terry Winograd, an eminent scholar of human-computer interaction, was  
288 scheduled to give a talk to my department. We sat in a dim meeting room listening to  
289 Professor Winograd discuss his amazing life's work in which human computation has  
290 figured prominently. Professor Winograd had no slides because of the failed power,  
291 but his talk was an inspirational historical accounting of progress in human-computer  
292 interaction. Perhaps prophetically, *the internet was still working*—the university had  
293 decided that backup power would be allocated to connectivity during outages. As  
294 Professor Winograd spoke, we could tweet the event and some of the audience looked  
295 up things Professor Winograd was discussing, such as the old Eliza program with  
296 which some younger students were unfamiliar. It was a little warm and dark during  
297 the lecture, but we were enlightened! This occurrence was like a tiny visit to the  
298 future in which we will be making decisions such as: will it be slides and air condi-  
299 tioning or connectivity? The university had decided in advance on connectivity—  
300 surely the right choice given that had the emergency been more dire, communicating  
301 with the world and finding information would be the priorities. If we are to defy his-  
302 torical patterns of collapse in which social units devolve to more local forms afford-  
303 ing less protection of progressive social agendas, we will be using the powers of  
304 digital technologies of information and communication to do so. Unlike the Maya  
305 and the Romans who did not have foresight attained through research in archaeology  
306 and history to guide them, we can assess likely future problems now, and plan for  
307 them. We understand that sustaining social gains rests on information and communi-  
308 cation transmission at national and international scale, and we can prioritize resources  
309 in a future of scarcity just as my university prioritized internet connectivity.

310 The objective of this chapter has been to argue that social progress is made of  
311 fossil fuels. Once we realize the basis upon which this progress rests—and that it is  
312 not a given and it is not forever—we can plan to self-consciously expend resources  
313 to extend and maintain progressive social agendas. Net neutrality is one pertinent  
314 technological issue but there are many others including promoting broad-based  
315 computer science education to ensure that control of digital technology is not con-  
316 fined to technical elites, deciding who gets access to rare earth metals, encouraging  
317 citizen participation in the control of computing infrastructure, and continuing to  
318 develop innovative means of crowdsourcing to leverage whatever cognitive surplus  
319 we will have in the future. In short, at least some cycles of human computation  
320 should be used to plan for a future of scarcity in which economic decline will force  
321 us to use a smaller cognitive surplus wisely. This is just the sort of wicked problem  
322 that stands as a challenge to human computation which we can take on now, in an  
323 abundant present.

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326 voices. Sunny Gui provided useful background on life in China. Barton Friedland, Caitie Lustig,  
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Uncorrected Proof

# Author Queries

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<b>Queries</b>	<b>Details Required</b>	<b>Author's Response</b>
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AU3	Please provide publisher name and location for Rakocy et al. (2006).	
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